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THE INTERSTATE COMPACT IN
TRANSITION: FROM COOPERATIVE
STATE ACTION TO CONGRESSIONALLY
COERCED AGREEMENTS
BY KEVIN J. HERON*
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of the United States furnishes only two ex-
plicit mechanisms for resolving or controlling controversies and
concerns among the several states. The first, and least desirable of
the two, is embodied in article III, which extends the original juris-
diction of the Supreme Court to controversies between two or more
states.' The second, a more peaceful and preferred mode, is em-
braced in what is commonly known as the Compact Clause, which
obliquely acknowledges the inherent sovereign power of the states
to enter into compacts or agreements with one another subject
only to the consent of Congress.2 This latter method of interstate
cooperation and coordination is the subject of the present Article.
As a matter of historical record, the interstate compact device
was initially utilized by the pioneers of the original thirteen colo-
nies prior to the adoption of the Constitution.3 Perhaps as a result
* J.D., 1983, The National Law Center, George Washington University; B.S. in Eco-
nomics, 1980, Villanova University; Staff Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation. This Article
was prepared as part of the Foundation's College of Public Interest Law post-graduate fel-
lowship program.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; see Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1900).
2 US. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; see Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 245 (1900). The
Compact Clause provides in pertinent part-
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State ....
U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 3.
a See Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in
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of its placement in a section of the Constitution dealing with limi-
tations on state powers, the Compact Clause received scarce atten-
tion and was seldom used during a long period in our nation's his-
tory.4 Until the twentieth century, the compact mechanism was,
for the most part, exclusively employed for the settlement of
boundary disputes.5 With the successful creation of the Port of
New York Authority by compact in 1921,6 however, and the inspir-
ing contribution of Frankfurter and Landis several years later,7
there emerged a newly exalted nationwide interest in the use of
interstate compacts and agreements. At the present time approxi-
mately 176 operative compacts exist in this country encompassing
a multitude of subject-matter areas from energy conservation, nu-
clear waste, taxation, and transportation, to fisheries, flood control,
corrections, and mass transit.8
One of the most interesting, yet constitutionally suspect, at-
tempts to invoke the compact device in recent years was the enact-
ment of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Con-
servation Act (NPPA), which brings to light a previously
unconsidered topic in the law of interstate compacts-the extent
Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 694 (1925); infra text accompanying notes 34-36.
Intercolonial agreements were common before the American Revolution and continued to be
used under the Articles of Confederation. R. LEACH & R. SUGG, JR., THE ADMINISTRATION OF
INTERSTATE COMPACTS 4 (1959). The wording of the compact provision in the Articles of
Confederation was carried over into the Constitution substituting only the words "agree-
ment" and "compact" for "treaty, confederation or alliance." See id. at 4-5.
4 See R. LEACH & R. SUGG, JR., supra note 3, at 5-6. Only 21 interstate compacts were
entered into between 1789 and 1900; only 77 were concluded from 1900 to 1956. Id.
5 Id.; Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Arrangements: When is a Compact not a
Compact?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 63, 63 (1965).
' See Port of New York Authority Compact, 42 Stat. 174 (1921) (compact established
between New York and New Jersey to resolve conflict surrounding development and opera-
tion of Port of New York); W. BARTON, INTERSTATE COMPACTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 61
(1967); R. LEACH & R. SUGG, J., supra note 3, at 6-7 (popularity of interstate compacts due
to success of Port of New York Authority Compact); Engdahl, supra note 5, at 63 (increas-
ing recognition of interstate compacts since success of Port of New York Authority
Compact).
I See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 3, at 729. The thoroughly exhaustive treatment
of the Compact Clause undertaken by the preeminent legal scholars Frankfurter and Landis
reveals through practical illustration the extraordinary potential inherent in the compact
device to rectify many interstate problems that exceed the remedial resources of any one
state and yet are too small to warrant full scale federal involvement. See Engdahl, supra
note 5, at 63.
8 B. CRIHFIELD, INTERSTATE COMPACTS, 1783-1977 AN OvERvIEw, THE BOOK OF THE
STATES 1978-79, 580, 581 (1978); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS
AND AGENCIES (1979).
9 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839(h) (1982).
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to which Congress may constitutionally participate in the creation
of such agreements.10 Pursuant to the NPPA, Congress authorized
the states of Washington, Idaho, Montana, and Oregon to establish
a "regional agency" known as the Pacific Northwest Electric Power
and Conservation Planning Council (Northwest Power Council or
Council).11 The Council, which is alleged to be an interstate com-
pact,12 was subsequently created in April, 1981. Each of the partic-
ipating states has two representatives on the Council who are se-
lected by their governors. 3 The NPPA also meticulously details
the functions, responsibilities, and duties to be undertaken by the
Council, including the development of a regional conservation and
electric power plan and a fish and wildlife program. 4
The determination of whether the Council is an interstate
compact will essentially require an analysis of the respective roles
of the states and the federal government with regard to the forma-
tion of compacts. In this case, the basic issue is whether Congress
exceeded its appropriate constitutional role in designing and creat-
ing the Northwest Power Council or, conversely, whether the
states' actions with regard to the formation of the Council were
sufficient to classify the Council as the product of an interstate
agreement. While case law has firmly established that Congress
may give its consent in advance to an interstate compact, 5 and
may place appropriate conditions on that consent,"6 the question
10 See Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No.
96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980).
" 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(1)-(2) (1982).
12 It is not entirely clear from the face of the NPPA that Congress was in fact authoriz-
ing the establishment of an "interstate compact" since this term never appears in the sec-
tion setting up the Council. In response to a lawsuit challenging its constitutionality, how-
ever, the Council has alleged that it is a validly constituted interstate compact. See infra
note 110.
" 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2), (3) (1982).
14 See id. § 839b(a)(1). The purpose of the NPPA compact was to provide a "mecha-
nism through which the Pacific Northwest can resolve the differing claims over how the
Federal resources are to be shared and [to] begin coordinated planning to meet the electric
power needs of the region." HR REP. No. 976, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5989, 5993. The legislation particularly emphasizes "conserva-
tion and the development of renewable resources." Id. It enables participating states and
respective communities to "participate in the region's electric power decisionmaking pro-
cess." Id.
15 E. CORWIN & J. PELTASON, UNDERSTANDING THE CONsrruTnON 82 (1976); F. ZIMMER-
MANN & M. WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE CoMPAcrS 25 (1976); Donovan, State
Compacts as a Method of Settling Problems Common to Several States, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 5,
7 (1931); Note, The Interstate Compact-A Survey, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 320, 322-23 (1953).
6 Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 272-74 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902
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remains whether Congress may design and develop every detail of
an interstate compact as it did in the case of the Council.
This Article will explore the various elements and uses of the
interstate compact, and will specifically address the issue of how
far Congress may constitutionally wander in the formation of com-
pacts and in the direction of their activities.
I.
THE SOURCE AND SUBSTANCE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS
An interstate compact is an agreement between two or more
states established for the purpose of remedying a particular prob-
lem of multistate concern. 17 The roots of the interstate compact
stretch far back into our colonial history.18 Both the compact de-
vice and the congressional consent requirement had been incorpo-
rated into the Articles of Confederation by colonial statesmen who
wanted to protect the newly established Union from "the destruc-
tive political combination of two or more states."'19 The precise rea-
sons which led to the inclusion of a compact provision into the Ar-
ticles of Confederation likewise induced the incorporation of the
Compact Clause into the Constitution.20 Apparently without de-
bate, and with only modest revision, the framers retained the in-
terstate compact provision under article I, section 10, clause 3,
which, in part, provides that "no state shall, without the Consent
(1962); see Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 3, at 695.
' BLACK'S LAW DICMoNARY 736 (5th ed. 1979); Dodd, Interstate Compacts, 70 U.S.L.
REV. 557, 558 (1936).
'8 See Dodd, supra note 17, at 557; Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 3, at 692; supra
note 3 and accompanying text. There were at least nine boundary disputes settled by inter-
state compacts during the colonial period, including the Connecticut and New Netherlands
Boundary Agreements (1656), the Rhode Island and Connecticut Boundary Agreement
(1663), the Massachusetts and Rhode Island Boundary Agreement (1710), and the North
Carolina and South Carolina Boundary Agreement (1735). Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304
U.S. 92, 104 (1938); Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 3, at 730-32.
19 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 3, at 693. Article VI of the Articles of Confedera-
tion provides in pertinent part:
No two or more states shall enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance
whatever between them, without the consent of the united states in congress as-
sembled, specifying accurately the purpose for which the same is to be entered
into, and how long it shall continue.
Id.
I 0 See R. LEACH & R. SUOG, JR., supra note 3, at 4-5 (provisions of Articles of Confeder-
ation carried over to Constitution); Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 3, at 694 ("curb upon
political combinations by the States was retained almost in haec verba by the
Constitution").
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of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with an-
other State or with a foreign Power."'" The Constitution thus ex-
pressly recognizes the inherent sovereign power of the states to
enter into compacts or agreements, subject only to the consent of
Congress. 22 As indicated previously, the primary reason for this
consent requirement was to safeguard the newly created national
government from destructive state alliances.23 A second purpose,
however, was "to prevent undue injury to the interests of non-com-
pacting states.
24
Interstate compacts or agreements 25 are, in effect, contractual
arrangements between the participating states. 26 Fundamental ele-
ments of contract formation, such as offer and acceptance, are
therefore invariably present in all compact arrangements.27 As con-
tracts, interstate compacts are protected by the "contract impair-
ment clause" of the Constitution, which provides that "[n]o state
shall... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts
.... ,2. Once entered into, the terms of a compact may not be
altered by any one of the party states without consent of the other
member states. Likewise, the compact normally may not be re-
21 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 35 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (authority
of states to enter into compacts "is a power inherent in sovereignty limited only to the
extent that congressional consent is required"). Congressional consent to interstate com-
pacts has been required specifically where the agreement increases the political power of the
states in such a way that the compact may encroach on the sovereignty of other states or of
the federal government. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976); Virginia v. Tennes-
see, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893) (dictum); E. CORWIN & J. PELTASON, supra note 15, at 82; H.
ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 149 (1939); F. ZiIxMRMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note
15, at 23. Higher education, mental health, and juvenile compacts are a few examples of
interstate agreements that do not require the consent of Congress. F. ZIMmRmANN & M.
WENDELL, supra note 15, at 24.
22 See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 3, at 694-95.
2' United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588, 606 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd, 306 F.2d 270
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962).
25 The Supreme Court, in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893), stated that inter-
state compacts and agreements are one and the same: "Compacts or agreements- - . . we
do not perceive any difference in the meaning, except that the word 'compact' is generally
used with reference to more formal and serious engagements than is usually implied in the
term 'agreement' ... ." Id. at 520. See generally Engdahl, supra note 5, at 84 (distinctions
between "treaty," "compact," "agreement," and "convention" done away with by courts at
end of nineteenth century).
26 See F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note 15, at 7-11.
27 Id. at 8.
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 419 (1964) ("[v]alid
interstate compacts are within the protection of the obligation of contracts clause").
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voked unless all of the participants agree to such an action."
Since interstate compacts are part of the statutory law of the
member states, they will supersede all other conflicting state stat-
utes.30 In view of their contractual nature, compacts will also take
precedence over subsequent state statutory law."
The design of the interstate compact will necessarily depend
on the particular objective to be achieved by the compact arrange-
ment and on the individual desires and expectations of the negoti-
ating states. Nevertheless, past practice has reflected a certain de-
gree of commonality. The essential characteristics of such an
arrangement may be stated as follows:
(1) It is formal and contractual;
(2) It is an agreement between the states themselves, similar in
content, form, and wording to an international treaty, and usu-
ally embodied in state law in an identifiable and separate docu-
ment called the 'compact';
(3) It is enacted in substantially identical words by the legisla-
ture of each compacting state;
(4) At least in certain cases, consent of Congress must be ob-
tained; in all cases, Congress may forbid the compact by specific
enactment;
(5) It can be enforced by suit in the Supreme Court of the United
States if necessary;
(6) It takes precedence over an ordinary state statute.3 2
Although our system of government maintains various devices
for interstate cooperation, such as reciprocal laws, administrative
agreements,3 3 and membership on state-federal advisory commis-
sions, the interstate compact, as both a contract and a statute, has
become the most forceful and binding method for states to resolve
concerns and controversies among themselves.
29 State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951); see S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 419 (1964); F. ZIMMERMANN & h WENDELL, supra note 15, at 10-11.
30 F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, INTERSTATE COMPACTS SINCE 1925, at 42 (1976).
See F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note 15, at 3.
"F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note 30, at 42.
Administrative agreements are usually formal or informal arrangements between ad-
ministrative departments or officers of two or more states which do not require congres-
sional consent and are normally not legally binding. See id. at 37.
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II.
THE HISTORICAL PROGRESSION OF THE INTERSTATE COMPACT
Traditionally, interstate compacts or agreements were used to
resolve disputes between neighboring states, particularly contro-
versies concerning state boundaries. 4 The earliest compacts, which
predated the American Revolution, were usually established
through negotiations between the colonies and were then submit-
ted to the Crown for approval. 5 The incorporation of the consent
requirement into the Constitution, therefore, appears at least his-
torically to be "the republican transformation of the needed ap-
proval by the Crown."36
Despite their usefulness in helping to control interstate con-
flicts, compacts were employed sparsely until the twentieth cen-
tury. In fact, between 1783 and 1920, only thirty-six interstate
compacts came into existence.37 The need to extend and diversify
the uses of the compact device arose shortly after the first World
War in response to the rapid development of our nation. With this
expansion there arose complex regional problems, wholly unsuited
to federal control, which required regional solutions.3 8 Perhaps the
most significant event in the advancement of interstate compacts
was the creation of the New York-New Jersey Port Authority
Compact in 1921."9 Pursuant to this arrangement, New York and
New Jersey established the first interstate compact agency, which
was authorized to develop, construct, and operate transportation
facilities in the bi-state port area.40
Another major accomplishment in the use of interstate com-
pacts in the 1920's was the formation of the Colorado River Com-
pact.41 This agreement, entered into by seven western states, was
primarily designed to allocate the waters of the Colorado River
among its members. 42 The Colorado River Compact was significant
because of both its expansive geographical reach in the resolution
34 See B. CRIHFIELD, supra note 8, at 580; supra note 5 and accompanying text.
31 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 3, at 692.
36 Id. at 694.
17 See B. CRIHFIELD, supra note 8, at 580.
See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 3, at 707.
-9 42 Stat. 174 (1921); see W. BARTON, supra note 6, at 61; R. LEACH & R. SUGG, J&.,
supra note 3, at 6-7.
" See 42 Stat. 174, 174 (1921).
41 Boulder Canyon Project Act, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928).
42 Id.
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of a regional problem and the multitude of states that agreed to
participate. It has set a precedent for a number of other agree-
ments in the West concerning water apportionment.43
During the 1930's, interstate compacts continued to emerge
with relative frequency. Simultaneously, compacts began to assume
national, rather than merely regional, significance. The Interstate
Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers," for
instance, had a nationwide membership. Similarly, the Interstate
Oil and Gas Compact,45 essentially the precursor to contemporary
energy conservation efforts, also permitted participation by all
states involved in the production of gas and oil.46 Since 1935, this
compact has expanded from the original six states (New Mexico,
Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas) to a membership
of thirty states. Each state either produces gas and oil or is inte-
grally connected with its production and conservation.47
Other compacts established during the 1930's included the
Tri-State Pollution Compact, ratified by the states of Connecticut,
New Jersey, and New York, to deal with pollution in New York
Harbor; the Ohio River Valley Sanitation Compact (eight states),
designed to control and reduce the pollution of the Ohio River
drainage basin and its tributaries; the Pennsylvania-New Jersey
Toll Bridge Compact, established to control interstate toll bridges
on the Delaware River; and the Palisades Interstate Park Agree-
ment, created for the purpose of establishing park and recreational
systems in New York and New Jersey.48 In total, approximately
eighteen new interstate compacts were formed in this country dur-
ing the 1920's and 1930's.
From 1940 until the early 1970's the interstate compact was
used with more frequency and variety than at any other time in
history. During this thirty-year period, over 100 agreements and
compacts were enacted-almost twice as many as were established
during the previous 167 years.49 A brief listing of some of the areas
covered by compacts created between 1940 and 1970 would include
fisheries conservation, land and water resources, forest fire protec-
13 See generally Stinson, Western Interstate Water Compacts, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 655
(1957).
" See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
:5 49 Stat. 939 (1935).
46 See id.
47 M. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPAcTs: A QUESTION OF FEDERALISM 262 (1971).
48 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1950-51, at 26-27 (1950).
49 B. CRIHFIELD, supra note 8, at 580.
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tion, mining practices, corrections, taxation, nuclear energy, educa-
tional facilities, civil defense, mass transit, health services and fa-
cilities, economic growth research, waste disposal, and flood
control.50
For no apparent reason, the pace of interstate compact devel-
opment has diminished since the beginning of the 1970's. Activity
in the compact area still abounds, however, primarily in the form
of state ratification of existing compacts and alterations to existing
arrangements.51
III.
THE PROCESS OF INTERSTATE COMPACT FORMATION
The Compact Clause contains no procedural requirements to
which states must adhere in establishing an interstate agreement.
Therefore, "practice seems largely to have developed from us-
age. ' 5 2 Past experience demonstrates that interstate compacts were
usually derived through negotiations between the party states,
which formed "joint compact commissions" to discuss, develop,
and draft the terms of a compact.5 3 While this method is still uti-
lized to devise boundary and water allocation compacts, the use of
such commissions has declined since the 1930's largely because
they were often slow in formulating compact agreements.
In contemporary practice, joint commissions have been re-
placed with extra-legal organizations composed of various state of-
ficials who share a common desire to rectify a particular problem
of interstate concern.5 4 Under this process, the state officials de-
velop a "compact," which is then enacted by a state as a statute.
This essentially constitutes an offer by that state to enter into a
compact, the acceptance of which is indicated by the enactment of
an identical statute by other states.5 5 This method of compact for-
mulation tends to expedite the entire compacting process. Addi-
tionally, by giving all states the opportunity to participate in an
arrangement, this process allows the compact device to be used for
11 See id.; CouNcIL OF STATE GovERNMENTs, INTERSTATE COMPACTS AND AGENCIES
(1979).
51 See Jones, Interstate Compacts and Agreements: 1978-79, in THE BOOK OF THE
STATES 1980-81, at 596, 597-600 (1980).
52 F. ZIMMERMANN & MK WENELL, supra note 30, at 85.
53 Id.
See F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note 15, at 17-18.
55 Id.
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the resolution of national as well as regional concerns.
An interesting illustration of a compact formed by the offer-
acceptance process is the Interstate Compact for the Supervision
of Parolees and Probationers. The congressional authorization for
this compact had been provided in the Crime Compact Act of
1934, which encouraged states to enter into agreements or com-
pacts for cooperative effort in the prevention of crime and in the
enforcement of their criminal laws and policies, and to establish
agencies, joint or otherwise, to effectuate such agreements and
compacts .5  The Compact on Parolees and Probationers, which
claims a membership of all fifty states as well as the Virgin Islands
and Puerto Rico, provides for the interstate transfer of parolees
and probationers to secure better employment opportunities for
such individuals and to facilitate their rehabilitation.
Unlike the Port of New York Authority Compact, which was
negotiated by a joint commission authorized by both states, the
Compact on Parolees and Probationers was created by an extra-
legal organization composed of attorneys general and other state
officials who had not received express approval from their respec-
tive states to negotiate a compact.57 The organization nonetheless
prepared the terms of an agreement that was then recommended
to and accepted by the states. Because of the favorable results of
the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Proba-
tioners, this method of compact formation has subsequently been
used quite frequently.
This procedure has been employed most recently by the Na-
tional Conference of State Legislators, whose goal was to encourage
states to adopt compact legislation to control low-level nuclear
waste.58 The federal legislative framework for the creation of such
compacts is the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980,5'
pursuant to which, states are authorized to establish interstate
compacts for the purpose of disposing of all low-level radioactive
waste generated within the member states. Waste that results
through federal defense, research, and development activities is ex-
56 48 Stat. 909 (1934), 4 U.S.C. § 112 (1982) (compact for cooperative effort and assis-
tance in crime prevention).
F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note 30, at 85-86.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: Low LEVEL
NUCLEAR WASTE, Issue Brief, April 15, 1981.
59 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021- 2021d (1982) (commission authorized to enter into compacts with
governor of any state).
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empted from such compacts. At the present time, thirty-seven
states have ratified low-level radioactive waste compacts through
state legislation.6
While the procedures for creating interstate compacts may
vary from the very rigid, formal methods of intensive and lengthy
interstate discussions to the more simplified, informal negotiations
of an interested group of state officials, all interstate compact sce-
narios include negotiation, preparation of the compact document,
and ratification by potential party states. The compact itself will
usually contain the purpose of the agreement, the establishment of
an administrative agency, a description of the powers, functions,
and duties of the agency, and termination and withdrawal provi-
sions."' Depending on the nature of a particular compact, this list
of factors may be lengthened or shortened in accordance with the
demands of the compacting parties.
Once the purpose of the interstate compact has been deter-
mined, the states must decide how best to effectuate that purpose.
In some cases, the existing agencies of the member states may be
fully equipped to carry out the compact plan. Pursuant to the Col-
orado River Compact, for example, the party states use their own
administrative agencies to carry out the appropriation of water ac-
cording to the terms of the compact.2 In other instances, however,
the complexity of the arrangement and the absence of intrastate
resources necessitates the formation of a special interstate
agency. 3 When such an agency is created, the compact should
clearly specify the participants in its operation and should suffi-
ciently detail its powers and duties.
Since all interstate compacts are contractual arrangements be-
tween the member states, the compact should contain a provision
for modification of the agreement as well as a provision for state
withdrawal from and termination of the compact. A typical provi-
sion for termination is contained in the Colorado River Compact,
which provides that the compact can be terminated only by the
60 Jordan, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management: An Update, in NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 1984, 58-59 (1984).
e, See F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note 15, at 28.
'2 See id. at 29.
63 The Port of New York Authority Compact, 42 Stat. 174 (1921), the Tahoe Regional
Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969), and the Pacific Marine Fisheries
Compact, 61 Stat. 419 (1947), are examples of compacts that have established special ad-
ministrative agencies.
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unanimous agreement of the signatory states. 4
After the essential terms and provisions of the compact have
been drafted, the agreement must then be ratified by each of the
party states.6 5 The ratification process essentially consists of the
passage of a statute by the state legislature which contains the full
text of the compact agreement. Since the compact is a contract, it
must be enacted in identical fashion in each member state. After
the state legislature has enacted the appropriate statutory legisla-
tion, it is submitted to the governor for approval or disapproval.
Once the compact is fully ratified by the state, the terms of the
compact may not thereafter be altered or amended without the
consent of the other party states.
IV.
CONGRESS' ROLE REGARDING INTERSTATE COMPACTS
The Compact Clause provides that a state may not enter into
an agreement or compact with another state without the consent
of Congress. This sole limitation on the states' ability to enter into
compacts or agreements provides Congress with its substantive
source of power with respect to such arrangements. The require-
ment of congressional consent is designed primarily to ensure that
agreements or compacts between the states do not encroach upon
areas of federal authority or federal laws or areas in which the na-
tional interest is at stake.6 The judiciary has determined, there-
fore, that the only agreements requiring congressional consent are
those which might affect the political balance within the federal
system or affect power delegated to the national government.6 "
In Virginia v. Tennessee"' the Supreme Court was confronted
with a boundary dispute between the states of Virginia and Ten-
nessee. 9 Virginia asserted that the boundary line had been conclu-
" See Colorado River Compact, art. X, 45 Stat. 1057 (reproduced in F. ZIMMERMANN &
M. WENDELL, supra note 15, at 83). Article X of the Colorado River Compact provides:
This compact may be terminated at any time by the unanimous agreement of the
signatory States. In the event of such termination all rights established under it
shall continue unimpaired.
Id.
F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note 15, at 19.
Id. at 10.
e See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363
(1976); Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155 (1894); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
- 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
69 Id. at 504.
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sively established by the English Charters and that the compact
entered into between the states some 85 years earlier, for the pur-
pose of re-establishing such a line, was invalid because it had not
received the consent of Congress. The Court first addressed the is-
sue of whether the Tennessee-Virginia Compact was within the
ambit of the Compact Clause, noting that agreements that are
outside the scope of the clause do not require the consent of Con-
gress. The Court determined that the requirement of congressional
consent applied only to those arrangements that would tend to in-
crease "the political power or influence" of the compacting states
"and thus encroach.., upon the full and free exercise of Federal
authority. ' 70 Having concluded that the compact in question fell
within the foregoing category, the Court then considered whether
70 Id. at 520; see also L. TRIBE, AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 402 (1978) (suggesting
that if either "presence" onto federal system or alteration of state's basic sphere of author-
ity are present, congressional consent is necessary); Dutton, Compacts and Trade Barrier
Controversies, 16 IND. L.J. 204, 209 (1940) (suggesting that conflict with federal power over
commerce, impairment of contractual obligations, attempt to achieve extraterritoriality, as-
sumption of treaty power, and "unlawful delegation of power" as basis for finding compacts
unconstitutional).
For some time it was unclear whether the consent of Congress was required for all com-
pacts. See Bruce, The Compacts and Agreements of States With One Another and With
Foreign Powers, 2 MINN. L. REv. 500, 500-01 (1918). This was primarily a result of to the
lack of commentary on the Compact Clause at the constitutional convention, see Weinfeld,
What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by "Agreements or Compacts?" 3
U. CHL L. REV. 453, 457, 464 (1936), and of conflicting indications of the meaning of the
clause given by the Supreme Court. For instance, in Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.)
540 (1840), Chief Justice Taney indicated that all compacts required consent, id. at 570-72,
while in Virginia v. Tennessee, Justice Fields stated the converse rule in dicta, see 148 U.S.
503, 520 (1893); Dunbar, Interstate Compacts and Congressional Consent, 36 VA. L. REV.
753, 754 (1950); Note, A Reconsideration of the Nature of Interstate Compacts, 35 COLUM
L. REV. 76, 78 (1935).
The dicta from the Tennessee case, however, was followed sub silentio as the rule in
later cases. See, e.g., Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 246-48 (1900) (right of agreement
between one another belongs to several states, except as limited by constitutional require-
ment of congressional intent); Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155, 168-71 (1894) (compact of
1785 betwen Virginia and Maryland concerning navigation on Potomic River did not violate
Articles of Confederation nor was it set aside by Compact Clause). Not until 1975, however,
did the Supreme Court officially adopt the dicta of the Tennessee case. See New Hampshire
v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369-70 (1976).
For a discussion of which compacts are "political" in nature and thus require congres-
sional consent, see Note, Legal Problems Relating to Interstate Compacts, 23 IowA L. REV.
618, 623 (1938); see also Ladd, Federal and Interstate Conflicts in Montana Water Law:
Support for a State Water Plan, 42 MoNT. L. REv. 267, 275 (1981) (pointing out that com-
pacts allocating waters between western states have required consent); Maier, Cooperative
Federalism In International Trade: Its Constitutional Parameters, 27 MERCER L. REV. 391,
417 (1976) (suggesting congressional prerogative to decide when national interest at stake
thus necessitating consent).
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Congress had consented to the arrangement. Recognizing that con-
sent may either precede or follow the creation of a compact and
may be either express or implied, the Court determined that Con-
gress, through its previous reliance on the terms of the compact
for "judicial and revenues purposes," had impliedly consented to
it.71
The question of whether an interstate compact might en-
croach upon federal authority, thereby triggering the consent re-
quirement, is not always easy to answer. In United States Steel
Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission,2 the Supreme Court
was asked to review an interstate tax compact to determine
whether the agreement, which lacked congressional consent, was
valid under the Compact Clause. The purpose of this compact was
to facilitate the determination of tax liability for multistate tax-
payers and to promote uniformity in state tax systems.7 3 The com-
pact established the Multistate Tax Commission, composed of the
tax administrators from all of the member states, which, in addi-
tion to pursuing the above objectives, was also authorized to audit
multistate taxpayers at the request of a party state.74 Pursuant to
the terms of the compat, member states retained complete control
over the rate of tax and the tax base and were permitted to with-
draw from the compact at any time.75 Several multistate taxpayers,
threatened with audits by the Commission, filed suit alleging that
the compact was void under the Compact Clause since it had not
received the consent of Congress. 6 Concluding that there was no
violation of the Compact Clause, the Court reasoned that since the
compact did not "authorize the member [s]tates to exercise any
powers they could not exercise in its absence," no "enhancement of
state power" in relation to the federal government existed. 7 Thus,
the compact did not require the consent of Congress because it fell
71 148 U.S. at 522.
72 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
73 Id. at 456.
74 Id. at 457.
76 Id.
71 Id. at 458. The taxpayers' complaint challenged the constitutionality of the tax com-
pact on four grounds: (1) lack of congressional consent; (2) burden on interstate commerce;
(3) violation of fourteenth amendment rights; and (4) violation of the fourth amendment by
the audit provisions. Id. The complaint survived a motion to dismiss but after discovery the
district court granted summary judgment to the Tax Commission. Id. at 458-59. The court
explicitly rejected the taxpayers' contention that the Compact Clause required congressional
consent for every agreement between two or more states. Id. at 459.
77 Id. at 473.
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outside the scope of the Compact Clause.
A. Congress May Attach Conditions to Its Consent
In conjunction with its power to grant consent, Congress may
also impose conditions on an interstate compact pursuant to its
"supervisory power over cooperative state action. 7 8 "The condi-
tion upon which consent is given, [however], cannot be more than
a technique for protecting existing federal interests" from en-
croachment by the interstate agreements.79
While case law has clearly established that Congress may con-
dition its consent to interstate compacts, 80 the parameters of con-
gressional power have not been defined. In United States v.
Tobin,"" however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit reviewed a Congressional condition attached to the
Port of New York Authority Compact. The provision, one gener-
ally contained in consent legislation,82 reserved to Congress the
right to alter, amend, or repeal its consent to the compact. The
court made it clear that "the vital condition precedent to the valid-
ity of any.., condition is that it be constitutional," and acknowl-
edged that the Compact Clause did not specifically confer upon
Congress the power "to alter, amend, or repeal" compacts.8 3 Ulti-
mately, however, the court declined to address the issue of the con-
78 Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981); see also Susquehanna River Basin Com-
pact, Pub. L. No. 91-575, §§ 1.4, 2, 84 Stat. 1509, 1512, 1537-38 (1970) (congressionally im-
posed conditions to ensure, inter alia, federal control over certain navigable waters, applica-
tion of certain federal statutes, no encroachment or restriction of executive powers); Petty v.
Tennessee-Missouri Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1959) (congressional consent condi-
tioned on states not impairing any federal rights); L. TRBE, supra note 70, at 402 (congres-
sional consent may be conditioned on state acceptance of congressionally mandated modifi-
cations). One commentator has stated that congressional imposition of conditions and
reservations has presented a "paradox," especially in light of congressional efforts to en-
courage the states to deal with regional problems through interstate compacts. Hines, Nor
Any Drop To Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part II: Interstate Arrangements
for Pollution Control, 52 IowA L. REv. 432, 444 (1966).
7 Note, Federal Investigatory Power over Bi-State Agency Through Reservation to
Congress Under Compact of Constitution, 8 VILL. L. REv. 237, 240 (1963). See generally
Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 3, at 707-08 (discussing federal interests with regard to
compacts).
80 See, e.g., Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 439-44 (1981) (Compact Clause vests power
to condition consent in Congress).
81 306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962).
82 See, e.g., The Wabash Valley Compact, Pub. L. No. 86-375, 73 Stat. 694, 698 (1959)
(Congress reserving the right to alter, amend, or repeal the Act).
83 Tobin, 306 F.2d at 272-73.
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stitutionality of the condition, and decided the case on non-consti-
tutional grounds."4
In addition to retaining the power to "alter, amend, or repeal"
a compact, Congress has on occasion limited its consent to a term
of years, has provided that states may not terminate an agreement
without its approval, and has imposed disclosure requirements
upon a compact agency."
B. How Congressional Consent is Conferred on an Interstate
Compact
Congressional consent is normally manifested by an act of
Congress or by joint resolution setting out the compact docu-
ment.8 6 Once congressional consent has been obtained, the agree-
ment is submitted to the President for approval.8 7 It has been a
rare instance when either congressional or presidential approval
has not been forthcoming.8 8
Congress occasionally has provided consent-in-advance legisla-
tion to entice states into forming compacts in particular subject-
matter areas. The Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parol-
ees and Probationers, for example, emanated from consent-in-ad-
vance legislation. 9 When Congress does give its consent in ad-
vance, however, the statute usually provides that the final compact
must be submitted to Congress for approval.90 Nevertheless, this
was not the case with the Parolees and Probationers Compact,
which was a "true" consent-in-advance statute.91
"' See id at 273. The Tobin court declined to address the constitutional issue as a re-
suit, in part, of the implications of such a decision. Id. The court commented that "[w]e
have no way of knowing what ramifications would result from a holding that Congress has
the implied constitutional power to alter, amend, or repeal its consent to an interstate com-
pact." Id.
85 See, e.g., Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(2)(B) (1982)
(providing congressional option to withdraw its consent every five years after compact has
taken effect).
66 See, e.g., Port of New York Authority Compact of 1921, ch. 77, 42 Stat. 174,
amended by 42 Stat. 822 (1922); Colorado River Compact, ch. 72, 42 Stat. 171 (1921) and 45
Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 617(b) (1970)); Potomac Compact, ch. 579, 54 Stat.
748 (1940) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 567(b) (1970)).
67 F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note 15, at 24.
SId.
69 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
60 F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note 15, at 25.
61 True consent-in-advance statutes are those in which actual consent exists "without
the limiting requirement of subsequent referral previously mentioned." F. ZIMMERMANN &
M. WENDELL, supra note 15, at 25.
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Although it had once been a settled proposition that congres-
sional consent did not transform the compact document into fed-
eral law,9 2 this proposition has recently been uprooted.9 3 In Cuyler
v. Adams,9 4 the Supreme Court was asked to interpret the terms of
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers9 5 After noting that not all
agreements fall within the ambit of the Compact Clause, the Court
stated that "where Congress has authorized the States to enter
into a cooperative agreement, and where the subject matter of that
agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation,
the consent of Congress transforms the States' agreement into fed-
eral law under the Compact Clause. '96 The Court concluded that
the Detainer Agreement was "an appropriate subject for congres-
sional legislation" and therefore its interpretation "present[ed] a
question of federal law."'9 7
C. Federal Participation in Compacts
Federal involvement with interstate compacts is automatically
provided for in the Compact Clause in the form of the consent re-
quirement. The function of Congress is to ensure that interstate
agreements do not impermissibly infringe upon federal interests
and concerns.98 While it customarily awaits the submission of a
completed compact for its review, Congress has on occasion ac-
tively participated in compact negotiations and later in compact
'2 While disputes arising under interstate compacts constitute federal questions subject
to review in federal courts, the interpretation of contract terms had been a matter of state
rather than federal construction. See People v. Central R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 455, 456
(1870) (congressional consent not a statute of United States within meaning of § 25 of Judi-
ciary Act); accord Hinderlider v. La Plata River Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (Congressional con-
sent held not to create treaty or statute).
1 See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981); Petty v. Missouri River Comm'n, 359 U.S.
275, 278 (1959); Delaware River Comm'n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419, 427 (1940); League to
Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 507 F.2d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975); see also Comment, Federal Question Jurisdiction to In-
terpret Interstate Compacts, 64 GEo. L.J. 87, 111 (1975) (Supreme Court basis of certiorari
on law of union doctrine unjustifiable). But see Engdahl, Construction of Interstate Com-
pacts: A Questionable Federal Question, 51 VA. L. REv. 987, 1048 (1965) (federal question
jurisdiction when interpretation of congressional act essential to plaintiffs cause of action).
449 U.S. 433 (1981).
,Id. at 435. The Detainer Agreement was a compact to which Congress consented in
advance when it passed the Crime Control Act of 1934. Id. at 441.
IId. at 440.
7 Id. at 442.
Is See supra note 79 and acompanying text.
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operations.9 9 From a state's perspective, congressional involvement
in negotiations has two distinct advantages. First, federal involve-
ment in the compact drafting early on may enhance the likelihood
of obtaining congressional consent. Second, if the operation of the
compact will require national assistance, federal representation
during the drafting stages is beneficial. 100
Congressional involvement in compact negotiations has re-
sulted from both state solicitation and congressional imposition.
For instance, certain consent-in-advance acts specifically require
federal participation in the compact negotiations as a prerequisite
to congressional approval of the final agreement.1 1 The Boulder
Canyon Project Act,102 an agreement between the States of Ari-
zona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyo-
ming for the development of the Colorado River, is such a statute.
Congressional consent, however, "[i]s given upon condition that a
representative of the United States, to be appointed by the Presi-
dent, shall participate in the negotiations." 10 3 The federal govern-
ment has also participated in an operative compact agency in the
Delaware River Basin Commission, 04 established in 1961 by Dela-
ware, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and the United
States'0 5 to plan, develop, and manage the River Basin for flood
control, water supply, and pollution control. 0 6 Each of the partici-
pating parties has one representative on the Commission.10 7 An-
other compact, comparable to the Delaware River Basin Compact,
is the Susquehanna River Basin Compact, ratified by Congress in
1970.10 8
9 F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note 15, at 18; see also Grad, Federal-State
Compact: A New Experiment In Federalism, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 825, 829 (1963)(discussion
of rules of federal and state governments in formulating interstate compacts).
100 See F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, supra note 15, at 18-19.
201 Id.
102 43 U.S.C. § 617r (1982).
103 Id. § 617r(a).
I" Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
105 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6501-6511 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:11D-1 to 115 (West
Supp. 1985); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 21-0701 (McKinney 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §
815.101 (Purdon Supp. 1985), consented to by Congress, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
,06 Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, § 1.2, 75 Stat. 688, 689-91
(1961).
107 Id. at 691.
108 Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970).
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V.
CONGRESS HAS No AUTHORITY UNDER ITS CONSENT POWER TO
WRITE EACH AND EVERY TERM OF AN INTERSTATE COMPACT
The interstate compact device, which once maintained an une-
ventful and unilluminating existence in our history, has evolved
into the foremost method for states to control and resolve
problems of an interstate character. The potentialities inherent in
the compact device, which were so presciently described some 60
years ago by Frankfurter and Landis, have since come to fruition
over the past half-century in diverse forms and fashions. Clearly,
the dominant theme that has pervaded the entire interstate com-
pact "movement" since the 1920's has been the expansion of the
uses of this device in as many creative and imaginative ways as our
system of government would allow. The American system of gov-
ernment is a system rooted in federalism, in which the respective
powers of the states and of the federal government can be exer-
cised in simultaneous and complementary fashion to rectify situa-
tions that are otherwise ill-suited to solution without such joint
action.
Despite the abundant and fruitful gains that have resulted
from the creative and expansive application of the compact instru-
ment, great care must be taken to ensure that such creativity does
not transgress constitutional proscriptions. For example, the
Northwest Power Council scenario, discussed briefly in the intro-
duction,10 9 raises serious questions as to how far Congress may go
in the establishment of interstate compacts. 110 In the case of the
100 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
o In 1983, a coalition of homebuilders and wood products manufacturers brought suit
against the Council alleging, inter alia, that the procedure for selecting Council members
violates the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which requires that all "Officers of
the United States" be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The suit was brought in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals pursuant to the Northwest Power Planning Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839f(c)(5). See Seattle
Master Builders Ass'n v. Northwest Power Planning Council, No. 83-7583 (9th Cir., filed
July 29, 1983). The homebuilders have alleged that the Council members are officers of the
United States since they exercise significant federal authority pursuant to the Northwest
Power Planning Act. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 52-53, Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v.
Northwest Power Planning Council, No. 83-7585 (9th Cir., filed July 29, 1983). In Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court determined that individuals exercising signifi-
cant federal authority are deemed to be officers of the United States. Id. at 131. Accord-
ingly, the homebuilders argue that the appointment of Council members must be executed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Petitioner's Opening Brief at
52. In addition, the homebuilders allege that the Council is not a Compact Clause Agency.
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Council, Congress itself drafted each and every term of the corn-
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 59.
There is some support in the legislative history for Petitioner's view that the Northwest
Power Planning Council is an entity violative of the Appointment's Clause. On March 11,
1980, the Department of Energy, pursuant to a request made by the Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, reported its recommendations on the Northwest
Power Planning Act. H.R. REP. No. 976, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 60, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6058. With regard to the provisions of the Act dealing with the composi-
tion and authority of the Northwest Power Planning Council, the Department of Energy
commented:
These provisions vest substantive executive powers in individuals who are not ap-
pointed by the President or the head of a cabinet department and appear to vio-
late the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2.
The Department of Justice has taken a similar position as expressed in its letter
to you dated January 9, 1980. We defer to the views of the Department of Justice
on this matter.
Id. at 6059.
On the other hand, portions of the legislative history suggest that the make-up of the
Council presents no constitutional difficulties. According to a House Report-
[Tihe Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution has been raised as a
possible impediment to gubernatorial appointment of these Council members.
However, the Committee believes that the Constitution allows the Congress,
through the broad powers it possesses under the Commerce and Property Clauses
of the Constitution, to share with the States the type of responsibilities granted to
the Council by this legislation and that the Appointments Clause does not prevent
an interstate arrangement such as this where the Congress expressly consents to
share responsibility with the States in an area of mutual, rather than purely Fed-
eral, responsibility. Energy planning is interstate in character, particularly in the
Pacific Northwest where the four States and the Federal Government are bound
together by their shared interest in, and mutual dependence upon, and integrated
regional power system.
Id. at 6038.
Similarly, Representative Pat Williams commented:
The Appointments Clause of the Constitution (Art. 2, Sec. 2, Cl. 2) has been
raised as a possible impediment to State appointment of Council members..Care-
ful constitutional research, however, shows that the Congress may share with the
states authorities such as those given to the Council. The Appointments Clause
relates to separation of powers between the branches of national government, not
to mechanisms such as the Council, in which state officials would be acting pursu-
ant to state authority within the framework of a federal law.
Id. at 6063.
Despite the position taken by the Department of Justice during the legislative debates,
in the Seattle Master Builders action, the United States intervened and ultimately con-
cluded that the Appointments Clause challenge made by Petitioners should be dismissed.
See Brief of Intervenor United States of America.
In response, the Northwest Power Planning Council contends that it is a validly created
interstate compact whose members are state rather than federal officers. See Brief of Re-
spondent Northwest Power Planning Council at 64. In addition, the Northwest Power Plan-
ning Council has responded to the argument that the Federal government's participation
has been too pervasive by pointing out that Congress has merely "followed its standard
practice of offering the states a chance to participate in the regulation of a federally
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pact document (40 pages of text) and submitted it to the four Pa-
cific Northwest states for their approval.' If the states had re-
fused this "offer" by Congress, a federal agency would have
automatically been established to perform the Council's func-
tions.112 Such action by Congress exceeds what is permissible
under the terms of the Constitution and, as a matter of federalism,
must forthrightly be rejected.
The sole authority afforded to Congress under the Compact
Clause is the power to grant or withhold consent to interstate com-
pacts. As a consequence of this power, Congress also has the im-
plied power to attach conditions to such arrangements. Pursuant
to its compact authority, Congress essentially exercises a "supervi-
sory role" over state agreements and compacts to ensure that fed-
eral interests are not adversely affected. In furtherance of this su-
pervisory role, Congress has on occasion participated in compact
negotiations and has taken a seat on various compact agencies." 3
Such behavior by Congress, which is in fact more the exception
than the rule, is entirely within the parameters of the power
granted to Congress under the Compact Clause. There is nothing
in these types of congressional acts that offends either this express
constitutional provision or the underlying Founding Fathers' in-
tent. These actions by Congress are simply designed to protect fed-
eral interests that might otherwise be affected by particular inter-
state arrangements. They are entirely consistent, therefore, with
preemptible field on conditions it felt necessary to ensure harmony with the federal regula-
tory scheme." Brief of Respondent at 68.
"I The states themselves were essentially given only one role in the formation of the
Council-to acquiesce to Congress' will by appointing their respective members. According
to the NPPA, the appointment of at least six members "shall constitute an agreement by
the States establishing the Council . . . ." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2) (1982). The Compact
Clause, however, specifically refers to states entering into agreements or compacts with
other states.
In the case of the Council, the States neither negotiated with each other to form an
agreement nor individually developed, by statute, a compact arrangement to be accepted by
the others. The States themselves do not even refer to the Council as an interstate compact
in their state legislation regarding appointment of Council members. See IDAHO CODE § 61-
1202 (Supp. 1985); Op. REv. STAT. §§ 469.800-469.845 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.52A.30
(Supp. 1986).
112 16 U.S.C. § 839(b)(b)(1) (1982).
11s See, e.g., Colorado River Compact, ch. 72, 42 Stat. 171, 172 (1921) (conditioning
consent to compact upon participation of United States in compact negotiations for "protec-
tion of the interests of the United States"). The United States Bureau of the Budget went
so far as to issue "a 'Guide to Federal Participation in Interstate Compact Negotiation' to
assist federal representatives participating in interstate negotiations." Hines, supra note 78,
at 444 n.64.
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the purpose underlying the sole limitation (consent requirement)
on the states' right to enter into compacts under the Compact
Clause.
The congressional attempt to establish each element of an in-
terstate arrangement, however, far exceeds the permissible bounds
of congressional authority under the Compact Clause. Allowing
Congress to use its limited authority in this manner essentially de-
prives the states of a specific right reserved to them by the Fram-
ers of the Constitution. That the limitation on the exercise of the
right cannot be used to abrogate it completely has been well ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court:
Whatever is reserved of state power must be consistent with
the fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The
reserved power cannot be construed so as to destroy the limita-
tion, nor is the limitation to be construed to destroy the reserved
power in its essential aspects. They must be construed in har-
mony with each other.114
The Founding Fathers fully understood the value of allowing
states to resolve disputes among themselves by using the compact
device. This "grassroots" process permits "regional wisdom and re-
gional pride" to devise solutions to regional problems.115 The "es-
sential aspects" of the compact mechanism would surely be lost if
Congress were to fabricate such arrangements under its limited
power of consent.11 While Congress indeed plays a critical role in
the development and operation of compacts,
questions of joining or not joining an interstate compact, of creat-
ing one, renewing or not renewing it, of appropriating money for
its support, of sanctioning and implementing activities, are
114 City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 509 (1965) (emphasis added) (quoting
Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934)).
115 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 3, at 708.
"' In addition to the Compact Clause, the Constitution contains several other provi-
sions that include a "consent" requirement. For instance, article II provides that all treaties
are subject to the consent of the Senate. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. This certainly does not
authorize the Senate to negotiate each and every term of a treaty between the United States
and a foreign power. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936), the Court stated: "he [the President] alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation,
the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it." Id. In addition,
"the treaty must contain the whole contract between the parties, and the power of the Sen-
ate is limited to a ratification of such terms as have already been agreed upon between the
President" and the foreign power. Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176,
183 (1901) (Brown, J. concurring) (emphasis added).
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uniquely the responsibilities of the states and their people, and it
is the states and their people which should have an intense con-
cern for what they may be gaining, losing, abandoning, delegating,
harming, or benefiting through the path of interstate compacts
117
To sanction an arrangement in which Congress negotiates and
drafts the terms of an interstate agreement that is then submitted
to the states for approval, would completely invert the compacting
process and the Compact Clause itself. Without question, this
would leave the interstate compact device "formally intact but
functionally a gutted shell."""8
Any suggestion that Congress might use its plenary power
under the Commerce Clause, rather than its limited power under
the Compact Clause to establish arrangements such as the North-
west Power Council is also without merit. In United States v.
Tobin, the Court acknowledged that Congress, pursuant to its ple-
nary powers, "has at its disposal abundant authority to supervise
and regulate the activities of operational compacts in such a way
as to insure that no violence is done by these compacts to more
compelling federal concerns."1 19 A crucial distinction exists, how-
ever, between the authority to supervise activities and the author-
ity to designate completely the nature of the activities.12 0 If Con-
gress were permitted to create arrangements like the Council
pursuant to its commerce power, the power of the states under the
Compact Clause would essentially be nullified and they would be
deprived of the element of state sovereignty specifically retained in
the Constitution. It must be remembered that "the sovereignty of
the States, within the boundaries reserved to them by the Consti-
tution, is one of the keystones upon which our government was
founded and is of vital importance to its preservation." 2
117 M. RMGEWAY, supra note 47, at 303 (emphasis added).
118 L. TRIBE, supra note 70, at 310.
"9 United States v. Tobin, 306 F.2d 270, 273 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902
(1962) (emphasis added).
110 Congress may not seek to accomplish under one constitutional provision that which
would be prohibited by another provision. For example, the Supreme Court in Railway La-
bor Executive's Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982), specifically noted that if "Congress
had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause," it
would "eradicate from the Constitution" the limitation requiring all bankruptcy laws en-
acted by Congress to be uniform in nature. Id. at 469 (emphasis added).
"I NAACP v. Thompson, 357 F.2d 831, 833 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 820
(1966).
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For well over 200 years, the compact device has operated as a
means for states to develop solutions to problems that are inter-
state in nature. The need to perpetuate this practice and to pre-
serve the power of the states in this regard is reflected still today
in the words of Frankfurter and Landis:
With all our unifying processes nothing is clearer than that in the
United States there are being built up regional interests, regional
cultures and regional interdependencies. [Citation omitted].
These produce regional problems calling for regional solutions.
Control by the nation would be ill-conceived and intrusive....
As to these regional problems Congress could not legislate effec-
tively. Regional interests, regional wisdom and regional pride
must be looked to for solutions ...
The inventive powers exacted from modern State legislatures
must grapple with problems whose stage is an interstate region.
Collective legislative action through the instrumentality of com-
pact by States constituting a region furnishes the answer.'22
While it is certainly desirable for both Congress and the states to
use their collective powers in the resolution of difficult and com-
plex regional problems, Congress must not be permitted to act in a
manner that would completely subvert the states' crucial role in
the compact process.
CONCLUSION
Of course, no one expects Congress to obliterate the states, at
least in one fell swoop. If there is any danger, it lies in the tyr-
anny of small decisions-in the prospect that Congress will nibble
away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially
nothing is left but a gutted shell.12'
The Framers' incorporation of the compact mechanism into
the Constitution preserved to the states a special power of state
sovereignty. Throughout the years, this device has been used in a
variety of circumstances, from the settlement of boundary disputes
in the 1600's to the disposition of nuclear waste in the 1980's. In all
of these instances, however, the interstate compact has remained
an instrumentality of the states and has successfully been exer-
cised by the states for their own advancement. While Congress cer-
122 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 3, at 708.
123 L. TRIE, supra note 70, at 302.
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tainly plays an important role in the development of interstate ar-
rangements, particularly through consent-in-advance legislation,
Congress may not establish the essential elements of an interstate
compact. This responsibility is uniquely that of the states and
must remain so if we are to prevent the "gutted shell" scenario
from becoming an unpalatable reality.
